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18 Contesting 'globalisation from 
above' 
International non-governmental 
organisations and the prospects for 
global social contract 
Baogang He and Hannah Murphy 
Introduction 
A growing literature testifies to the emerging importance of what may be 
termed a 'global social contract' in contesting the neoliberal economic order. A 
global social contract constitutes a normative condition for what Richard Falk 
calls 'humane governance'. Will this develop into a new paradigm and become 
a new form of persuasion? This chapter considers the prospects for, and rele-
vance of, a global social contract to the international trade regime. It explores 
the ways in which the activities of international non-governmental organisa-
tions (INGOs) and their networks are contesting World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) agreements and contributing to the development of a global social 
contract. Through six case studies of INGO campaigns, we test the normative 
definition, meaning and content of the global social contract concept. 
The idea of a global social con trace 
'Predatory globalisation', a term coined by Richard Falk, has empowered the 
international business sector and powerful nation states while undermining 
the voice of developing nations and ordinary citizens in general. As Falk 
asserts, international economic institutions are often secretive and do not 
allow developing countries to participate sufficiently in the formulation of 
global economic policy. Their activities also entrench inhumane practices, 
such as child labour and the destruction of the environment. 2 Moreover, it is 
predicted that in the twenty-first century, Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) 
will spend a third of their time addressing issues once seen as matters of 
social policy for which nation states were previously responsible. This will 
strike a major blow to democratic control by citizens. There is no political 
constitution to match the increasingly integrated global economy - the 
social contract is seen to be outside the mandate of the major international 
economic policy-making institutions.3 
According to Peter O'Driscoll, the Washington Consensus has brought 
about new rules of engagement, different from the Keynesian social contract 
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that combined economic growth with social improvement and provided a 
stable balance of power between the private and public sectors. These new 
rules have granted the private sector a disproportionate amount of power to 
the detriment of state institutions. However, it is argued that the Washing-
ton Consensus is now faltering4 and that there is a need for a 'new social con-
tract' to promote equitable development in less developed nations. 
Different conceptualisations of a global social contract have been formu-
lated by a diverse set of authors to address various aspects of the problems 
associated with globalisation from above. For Georg Kell and John Gerard 
Ruggie, the purpose of a global social contract is to regulate corporate prac-
tice and the corporate code of conduct. 5 At the Davos World Forum in 
January 1999, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan initiated the 'global 
compact' to challenge the international business community to help the UN 
implement universal values in the areas of human rights, the environment 
and labour standards. The global compact is understood as a framework of 
reference as well as a dialogue to stimulate best practices and to bring about 
a convergence in corporate practices around universally shared values. 
According to Mazarr, the global social contract is a contract between nation 
states and international organisations whereby nation states will begin grad-
ually to entrust elements of their security to a coalescing set of global 
norms. 6 In the eyes of Richard Falk, a global social contract is a new equilib-
rium that strikes a balance between capital and society, between capital-
driven social forces and people-driven social forces. It strikes the sort of 
balance similar to that which the state once assumed between society and 
the market at an earlier stage of capitalism.7 A global social contract also 
'provides for basic human needs and regulatory uniformity, resembling the 
achievement of social democracy and the labour movement at the level of the 
state'.8 In the opinion of Richard Smith, a global social contract entails the 
rich accepting greater responsibility for the poor. He states that rich coun-
tries should transfer a quarter of their gross national product to poor coun-
tries in order to provide education, health care, social services, income 
support and the like. 'A true global society would mean a global social con-
tract between rich and poor'. 9 
Alain Touraine calls for the globalisation of social movements from below 
to recover individual freedom that has been lost in the process of the globali-
sation of capitalism. Richard Falk describes the activities and campaigns of 
INGOs as globalisation from below against the forces of globalisation from 
above. Civil society has emerged as a viable 'third sector' with experience 
and insight into how to balance economic growth with social and environ-
mental concerns. INGOs can monitor and disseminate information about 
corporate behaviour, which can be combined with appropriate government 
regulation and funding of selected development programmes. Consensus 
needs to be built on the priority of certain development outcomes and the 
respective roles for government, business and civil society need to be negoti-
ated. This is the essence of Driscoll's 'new social contract'. 10 
Contesting iglobalisation from above' 243 
Through the lens of global social contract theorising~ some INGOs view 
the agreements of the WTO as economic contracts that lack accountability 
and democratic legitimacy; the WTO is seen as determined to realise its 
goal of trade liberalisation regardless of the social and environmental con-
sequences. In challenging the WTO's authority~ some INGOs are attempt-
ing to establish a global social contract with the organisation, aiming to 
inject social and environmental justice into its regulatory framework of 
agreements. The elements of a global social contract in this sense include the 
development of a democratic process in establishing the contract~ the inclu-
sion of social protection and rights for the poor and weak, and ensuring that 
the international business sector behaves in a responsible and accountable 
manner. In this context, successful INGO action has redefined the terms and 
content of WTO agreements/contracts, by modifying existing WTO agree-
ments and establishing a symbolic alternative to the existing trade regime 
through the practice of fair trade. 
In essence, a global social contract is a political and moral principle for 
addressing the problems arising from globalisation from above. The idea of a 
global social contract is comprised of three core elements. The first is that 
the global social contract is global, that citizens residing in developed, devel-
oping and under-developed nations are equally relevant contracting parties. 
This element is related to the principle of global citizenship, which stresses 
that people, citizens and global society are the most important third con-
tracting parties beyond the conventional notion of a bilateral contract 
between nation states and international organisations. The second is the 
social element, which refers to the incorporation of adequate social protection 
and the principle of equality into the actual content of global economic 
policy. The third is the element of contract meaning that the agreement is 
based on consent (not imposed from above) and that the process of reaching 
an agreement is transparent in that those administering global economic 
policy operate with an appropriate level of democratic accountability and 
transparency. 
Many empirical questions arise with regards to the role of INGOs in 
building a global social contract. (1) Are INGOs significant parties to the 
global social contract? Are they outsider challengers or insider policy-
making participants? (2) Have INGOs successfully challenged the inter-
national business community in implementing universal values? (3) In 
challenging the undemocratic process, do INGOs make the process more 
democratic, and in what sense? (4) Do INGOs force the WTO to revise 
some economic contracts in order to meet social demands? (5) Do the poor 
benefit from the campaigns against the WTO agreements organised by 
INGOs? (6) Do INGOs make trade fairer? Do they make the WTO agree-
ments fairer and in what sense? Table 18.1 lists these six concrete and 
testable empirical questions and summarises how INGOs employ the notion 
of a global social contract to contest the practice and content of the WTO 
agreements from these perspectives. 
Table 18.1 WTO Agreements and the global social contract 
Perspectives WTO agreements 
Who Nation states, in particular, 
powerful nation states such as the 
US, EU and Japan, and large 
corporations are the principal 
parties to the economic contracts. 
What: issue and value Economic issues related to 
international trade such as tariffs, 
intellectual property rights and 
trade in services etc. 
How: process No direct democratic accountability 
to ci tizens. WTO negotiations are 
dominated by powerful states. 
Nature Economic contract. 
Global sodal wntrad 
A global social contract must involve 
international organisations, states 
and civil society. INGOs are striving 
to become active parties in the 
development of a global social contract. 
A global social contract must duly 
account for human rights and 
environmental sustainabiE ty. 
Citizens must be given certain 
rights when their states enter into 
global economic contracts. The voice 
of people in developing countries 
must be heard and weighted. 
Global and social contract. 
Whom Nation states and the international A global social contract accounts 
Fairness 
business sector. for the social costs of economic 
globalisarion and ensures that the 
rights and interests of poor 
countries and the poor people of 
rich countries are protected. 
Unfair to rhe poor and unemployed Emphasis on the equity of global 
rules. 
Testable questions 
(l) Are INGOs significant parties in 
the emerging global social contrace? 
Are they outsider challengers or 
insider policy-making participants? 
(2) Have INGOs successfully 
challenged the international business 
community in implementing 
universal values? 
(3) In challenging the undemocratic 
process, do INGOs make the process 
more democratic and accountable, 
and in what sense? 
(4) Do INGOs force the WTO to 
revise some economic contracts in 
order to meet social demands? 
(5) Do the poor benefitfrom the 
campaignsagainst the WTO 
agreements organised byINGOs? 
(6) Do INGOs make trade fairer? 
Do they make WTO agreements 
fairer and in what sense? 
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Sceptics such as Faux would stress the difficulty in creating a global social 
contract. He argues that a global social contract must be enforced by the 
international economic policy-making institutions, but that in the absence 
of a global democratic government, these institutions will be captured by 
business interests, which will prevent the enforcement of a global social con-
tract. 11 Buchanan too points to the danger that the efforts of civil society 
groups in challenging the accountability and transparency of the WTO may 
actually enhance the legitimacy of the institution making it more difficult 
for civil society to bring about more fundamental change. 12 
This chapter aims to (1) address the above six empirical questions and 
examine the roles of INGOs in constructing a global social contract, and (2) 
test the normative definition, meaning, and content of global social contract 
through six case studies of INGO campaigns directed at the WTO. The 
result of this study offers us a reasonable basis to assess the validity of the 
scepticism about the idea of a global social contract. This chapter adopts a 
normative empiricist approach 13 which enables us to develop an empirically 
based notion of a global social contract, and provides a solid empirical foun-
dation to develop what Falk calls 'normative renewal' toward a cosmopolitan 
or transnational democratic ethos of renewal. 14 
This normative empiricist approach starts with the real world. We 
strongly believe that an empirical approach is preferable to the Rawlsian 
approach that starts with an ideal world such as the veil of ignorance. This is 
because normative aspirations and conceptual tools for the framing of world 
order must have an empirical base and realistic driving forces. An applica-
tion of Lockean or Rawlsian social contract theory, which originated in the 
nation-state system, is an unproductive intellectual exercise. The outcome of 
a simplistic and purely theoretical extension is likely to lead to the argu-
ment made by Boswell that the application of social contract theory for 
solving problems at the global level cannot be achieved. The virtues of social 
contract theory are not replicated when applied to issues of international 
justice. This is because it reveals a tension between the goal of conflict regu-
lation and an ethically driven conception of justice, and this tension renders 
global social contract theory utopian. 15 Also unproductive is the internation-
alisation of the social contract. 16 This is because the internationalisation 
approach misses the urgent issue about the global social contract per se and 
carries with it uncontested nationalist assumptions. It also presupposes what 
the authors of the Global Civil Society 2001 yearbook refer to as 'methodo-
logical nationalism', which is the tendency for theorists to remain bonded to 
categories created for and applicable to nineteenth century industrial nation 
states. 17 
Below we provide a review of basic information about INGOs. This is fol-
lowed by the six case studies and a discussion and conclusion. 
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Some basic information about INGOs 
Tables 18.2-18.7 denote the existence of a large number ofINGOs and offer 
a breakdown of their different types. Table 18.2 shows that of the total 
number of INGOs, 36 are federations of international organisations, which 
constitute only 0.50 per cent; 474 are universal membership organisations, 
making up 6.53 per cent and 5,676 are regionally-oriented membership 
organisations, comprising the majority of 78. 17 per cent. It should be noted 
that a further 3,815 organisations are dissolved or apparently inactive. Table 
18.3 highlights the tremendous proliferation of INGOs over the past 
century. Table 18.4 demonstrates that both developed and developing coun-
tries have a high participation rate in INGOs. The majority of selected 
nations participate in over 25 federations of international organisations; 
China, Indonesia, Kenya, Thailand and Uganda participate in between 20 
and 25, while only Hong Kong (China) and North Korea participate in less 
than 20 federations ofINGOs. The figures in Table 18.5 however, show that 
the countries in which INGO secretariats are based are more or less geo-
graphically limited to Europe and North America. Is Table 18.6 lists the 
major INGOs and NGOs involved in the six case studies of campaigns 
against the WTO. Table 18.7 lists the number of NGOs in attendance as 
Table 18.2 Number of international non-governmental organisations by type 
(2004) 
Types 
A Federations of international organisations 
B Universal membership organisations 
C Intercontinental membership organisations 
D Regionally oriented membership organisations 
Total 
Number 
36 
474 
1,075 
5,676 
7,261 
% 
0.50 
6.53 
14.81 
78.17 
100.00 
Source: Yearbook of 1m ern at jot/a I Organizations (200412005) see Note 18. 
Table 1B.3 International non-governmental organisations by year and type 
( 1909-1999)19 
Type 1909 1951 1964 1972 1985 1991 1993 1995 1997 1998 1999 
A 43 39 39 38 39 37 37 
B 397 427 437 486 485 483 484 
C 796 773 783 1,001 997 1,074 1,057 
D - 3,440 3,381 3,571 3,596 4,064 4,172 4,247 
Total 176 832 1,470 2,173 4,676 4,620 4,830 5,121 5,585 5,766 5,825 
Source: Yearbook of International Organizations (199912000) Edition 36 (Munchen: K. G. Saur), 
modified, p. 2357. 
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Table 18.4 Selected country participation in international non-governmental organ-
isations by type (2004) 
Cotmtry/ types A B C D 
Australia 28 443 857 1,193 
Argentina 28 430 657 830 
China 24 356 565 622 
France 31 452 962 2,676 
Germany 29 452 957 2,667 
Hong Kong - China 16 326 418 516 
India 28 436 735 763 
Indonesia 23 363 348 445 
Japan 30 445 831 1,159 
Kenya 21 326 278 253 
Korea DPR 10 83 52 54 
Korea Republic 27 396 526 600 
Mexico 27 417 612 768 
South Africa 29 423 656 717 
Switzerland 30 430 873 2,065 
Thailand 21 385 354 443 
Uganda 20 234 132 174 
Vnited Kingdom 28 424 925 2,554 
USA 29 450 934 1719 
Source: Yearbook ({International Organizations (200412005), Edition 41 see Note 18, modified, 
pp. 1698-1707. 
observers at the five WTO Ministerial Conferences held to date, as well as 
the selected NGO campaigns in force at the time of (and surrounding) these 
meetIngs. 
Global day of action against the WTO 'Millennium 
Round' 
The 30 November 1999 Seattle street demonstration outside the WTO 
Ministerial Conference was part of a global day of action against neoliberal-
ism as designated by the People's Global Action (PGA) and the Jubilee 
2000 debt cancellation campaign. According to Wood, this global day of 
action involved III protest events in 22 countries in 97 cities, including 
two cities in Australia and New Zealand, seven countries and 20 cities in 
Asia, 12 countries and 41 cities in Europe and 34 cities across the United 
States (US) and Canada. 21 However, the most widely reported protest was 
that held in Seattle where an estimated 30,000 protesters22 consisting of 
trade unionists, environmentalists, human rights advocates, conservatives 
and neoisolationists stole the limelight from the WTO conference. 
Despite many accounts citing the protests as the reason for the break-
down of the conference and the failure to launch the Millennium Round, 
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Table 18.5 Selected countries in which international non-governmental organisa-
tion secretariats are located 
Country/types A B C D 
Australia 0 6 25 97 
Argentina 0 3 2 102 
China 0 0 3 11 
France 7 59 112 420 
Germany 1 20 70 378 
Hong Kong - China 0 0 1 41 
India 0 9 6 35 
Indonesia 0 0 0 7 
Japan 0 4 16 85 
Kenya 0 0 0 24 
Korea DPR 0 0 0 0 
Korea Republic 0 2 3 29 
Mexico 0 2 1 58 
South Africa 0 1 6 54 
Switzerland 9 69 70 166 
Thailand 0 0 3 29 
Uganda 0 0 0 11 
United Kingdom 2 61 190 546 
USA 3 82 168 418 
Source: Yearbook o/International Organizations (200412005), Edition 38 (Munchen: K. G. Saur), 
modified, pp. 1708-1715. 
it has been argued that the collaps.e of the WTO meeting was primarily due 
to disagreements among the major economic powers over many of the same 
issues for which protesters were lobbying. 23 The failure of the conference and 
the media coverage of the protest saw the WTO receive a great deal of 
negative press and this added weight to claims emanating from civil society 
that the WTO lacks transparency and accountability. 
In reaction to the intensity of the Seattle protests, the WTO sought to 
reinvigorate its public profile, which consisted mainly of an upgrade to the 
organisation's website. The website was used to showcase a series of public 
relations documents promoting the work of the WTO, a revised electronic 
document database, electronic forums, NGO bulletins and position papers 
and the WTO newsletter. 24 The WTO has also conducted a number of dia-
logues and briefings where NGO representatives are given the opportunity 
to attend informal discussions, workshops and technical seminars on trade-
related issues. 25 The WTO has created a chat room on its website for NGOs 
as well as posting NGO bulletins and NGO position papers. 26 
The WTO's attempts to remedy its poor image following the Seattle 
meeting are superficial and problematic. In regard to the expansion of its 
website - the development of chat rooms, online forums, the increased avail-
ability of documentation and so forth - the important issue of access to inter-
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Table 18.6 Selected INGOs and NGOs involved in selected campaigns against 
WTO agreements 
Campaigtt 
Global Day of Action 
Against the WTO 
'Millennium Round' 
Campaign for WTO 
Core Labour Standards 
Campaign Against the 
TRIPS Agreement 
Campaign Against the 
GATS Agreemenr 
INGOslNGOs 
A broad array of civil society groups including 
environmentalists, labour unions, human rights activists, 
protectionists, anti-capi talists, neoisolationists and 
. anarchists. 
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (lCFTU), 
World Confederation of Lab out (WCL), various 
International Trade Secretariats, Inrernational Textile, 
Garment and Leather Workers' Federation (ITGL WF), 
Inrernational Metalworkers Federation, Inrernational 
Federation of Chemical, Energy, Mine and General 
Workers' Union (lCEM), various research institutes and 
various NGOs (not affiliated to the above structures). 
Medecins Sans Fronrieres (MSF), Oxfam International, 
Catholic Agency for Overseas Development (CAFOD), 
ActionAid, ACT UP Consumer Project on Technology, 
Health Action International, Voluntary Service Overseas, 
Treatment Action Campaign (South Africa), Aids Access 
Coalition (Thailand), Health Gap Coalition (USA), Kenya 
Coalition for Access to Essential Medicines. 
World Developmenr Movement (UK), Bern Declaration, 
Public Services International (PSI), Focus on the Global 
South (Thailand), Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch, 
ActionAid (Uganda), Alternative Information and 
Development Centre (South Africa), ARENA (New 
Zealand), Business Watch (Indonesia), Center for 
International Environmental Law (Switzerland), Consumer 
Information Network (Kenya), EcoNews Africa (Kenya), 
11.11.11 (Belgium), Equations (India), Food Rights 
Alliance (Uganda), Gender and Trade Network in Africa, 
Institute for Global Justice (Indonesia), Institute of 
Economic Affairs (Kenya), International Gender and Trade 
Network Asia, Lawyers Environmental Action Team 
(Tanzania), Mwelekeo waNGO (Zimbabwe), Polaris 
Institute (Canada), Brazilian Network for the Integration 
among Peoples (REB RIP), Southern and Eastern African 
Trade Information and Negotiations Institute (SEATINI), 
Sod Net (Kenya), Tanzania Gender and Networking 
Programme, Third World Network Africa (Ghana), Trade 
Watch (Kenya), Australian Fair Trade and Investment 
Network (AFTINET). 
continued 
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Table 18.6 Continued 
Campaign 
Campaign Against a 
WTO Foreign 
. Investment Agreement 
Campaign for Fair 
Trade 
INGOslNGOs 
Oxfam International, Center for Consumer Defense of El 
Salvador, Public Citizen (United States), Third World 
Institute (Uruguay), Rede Brazileira Pela Integra.;:ao dos 
Povos (REBRIP) (Brazi!), Solon Foundation (Bolivia), 
Third World Network, World Wide Fund for Nature 
(WWF), Public Services International, Centre for 
International Environmental Law, Institute for Agriculture 
and Trade Policy, African Trade Network, International 
Gender and Trade Network (IGTN), Lutheran Wodd 
Federation, Seattle 2 Brussels Network, International 
Institute for Sustainable Development. 
Oxfam International, International Fair Trade Labelling 
Organisation, Fair Trade Federation, International 
Federation for Alternative Trade, European Fair Trade 
Association, and a vast number of alternative trade 
organisations including Equal Exchange, Global Exchange, 
TransFair USA, Oxfam Community Aid Abroad Trading, 
People For Fair Trade, Trading Parmers, Aid Through 
Trade, Twin Ttading, Traidcraft, Equal Exchange, Ten 
Thousand Villages, Pueblo to People, MarketPlace: 
Handwork ofIndia, SERRV International, Bridgehead, 
Stichting Max Havelaar and Nepali Bazaro. 
net services remains unresolved. Only those who can afford internet access, 
the majority of whom reside in industrialised nations, will see any benefit 
from these measures. In this way, the utilisation of its website underscores 
the WTO's focus on responding to 'noisy' NGOs from developed countries. 
The utility of the WTO's other measures concerning NGO relations are also 
questionable. For example, the WTO has retained a tight grasp on deciding 
which NGOs are granted accreditation for attendance at ministerial meetings 
and informal discussions of specific issues. The WTO selects NGOs that are 
deemed by the organisation to have a 'legitimate interest' in trade issues. 27 
Scholte et al. state that relations between the WTO and civil society have also 
tended to reinforce global structural inequality whereby WTO contact with 
civil society groups representing business interests and NGOs based in indus-
trialised nations is privileged over those NGOs situated in the global south. 28 
Overall, the WTO has approached its relations with civil society in a unilat-
eral manner where control and power over these relations remain vested in 
the hands of the WTO. Despite signs that the WTO might have revisited 
and extended its provisions for civil contact following the Seattle ministerial 
meeting, the organisation continues to resist meaningful dialogue with civil 
society organisations. 
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Table 18.7 WTO Ministerial Conferences, number of attending NGOs and associ-
ated INGO campaigns 
Year WTO Ministerial Number of NCO NCO Campaigm in progress 
C01l/erenre observers2o 
1996 Singapore 108 • Campaign for WTO Core 
Labour Standards 
1998 Geneva, Switzerland 153 • Campaign for WTO Core 
Labour Standards 
1999 Seattle, United States 776 • Campaign for WTO Core 
2001 Doha, Qatar 651 
2003 Cancun, Mexico 795 
Labour Standards 
• Global Day of Action Against 
WTO Millennium Round 
• Campaign Against the TRIPS 
Agreement 
• Campaign Against the TRIPS 
Agreement 
• Campaign Against a WTO 
Foreign Investment Agreement 
• Campaign Against the GATS 
Agreement 
Although the collapse of the Seattle conference cannot wholly be attributed 
to the 30 November 1999 global day of action, the protest was successful in a 
number of respects. The protest events highlighted citizen dissatisfaction over 
the WTO's inability to account for the negative consequences of international 
trade such as environmental degradation, human rights violations, poor labour 
standards and economic inequality. Moreover, these same issues that the pro-
testers aimed to emphasise were echoed by member states inside the confer-
ence and were ultimately the catalyst for the collapse of the meeting. Most 
importantly, the protest events received widespread media coverage, as did the 
WTO itself, which in turn heightened public awareness of the secretive nature 
of global trade policy. As Stigliani summarises, 
many people who had previously been unaware of or paid little attention 
to the WTO now have some sense of the purpose of the organisation and 
of the debate over the relative benefits and costs of the worldwide free 
trade that it seeks to promote. 29 
Campaign for WTO core labour standards 
Although the International Labour Organisation (ILO) provides a forum for 
the representatives of governments, employers and workers to discuss labour 
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standards, in recent years an increasing segment of the international labour 
movement has come to view the organisation as ineffective. The ILO's con-
ventions are voluntary and even where nations agree to adopt particular con-
ventions, the institution does not have the enforcement capacity to ensure 
these are upheld.30 The institutional transformation of the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) into the more powerful WTO in 1995 
led the international labour movement to argue that increased trade liberali-
sadon and strengthened trade rules permit labour exploitation and under-
mine national health and safety regulations. However, the creation of the 
WTO also presented the international labour movement with a legally 
enforceable arena in which to lobby for a set of core labour standards. The 
violation of labour rights in export sectors can broadly be conceived as an 
unfair trade practice that could be addressed through the WTO' s powerful 
dispute settlement body. 
The campaign for the incorporation of core labour standards into the 
WTO framework was led by the International Confederation of Free Trade 
Unions (ICFTU), one of the most entrenched global networks. 31 The cam-
paign stressed that international trade liberalisation under the WTO treats 
workers as factors of production rather than as human beings who deserve to 
have recourse to a standard set of basic rights that govern their treatment at 
work. 32 The ICFTU and other civil society groups involved in the campaign 
lobbied for the WTO to adopt a social clause that would commit states to 
respect seven basic ILO conventions (Conventions 87, 98, 29, 105, 100, III 
and 138).33 These conventions relate to freedom of association, the right to 
collective bargaining, the abolition of forced labour, prevention of discrimi-
nation in employment and a minimum age for employment.34 
The WTO's inaugural Ministerial Conference in Singapore in 1996 pre-
sented the ICFTU campaign with their first opportunity to secure a WTO 
labour rights clause. The domestic political importance of labour as an inter-
est group in developed countries assisted the campaign. At the WTO con-
ference, the European Union (EU) and the US strongly advocated that the 
WTO recognise labour issues. 35 However, the majority of developing coun-
tries opposed the incorporation of core labour standards into the WTO 
framework. Essentially) the debate centred around whether the WTO is the 
appropriate institution for enforcing labour standards and what impact such 
standards might have on the comparative advantage of countries that depend 
on labour-intensive industries. Developing countries argued that allowing 
the creation of unions would cause multinational companies interested 
in investing in countries with low labour costs and low labour activism to 
disinvest. 36 
There was also considerable disagreement amongst civil society groups 
regarding a WTO labour standards clause. Significantly, the Indian 
National Trade Union Congress as well as a great many civil society groups 
from developing countries opposed the incorporation of core labour stand-
ards into the WTO framework. 37 In a further setback to the ICFTU cam-
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paign, a coalition of NGOs organised by the Third World Network (TWN) 
issued a public statement that opposed the WTO taking on new issues 
including labour standards.38 Echoing developing country governments, the 
TWN statement claimed that developed country protectionists would use a 
labour standards clause to prevent the importation of products from less 
developed countries. Essentially, these groups viewed the WTO as 'a source 
of domination rather than an opportunity for justice' .39 
Despite discussion of labour issues dominating the Singapore conference, 
the proposal for a core labour standards clause at the WTO failed to be 
adopted, largely due to opposition from developing countries. However, the 
subject of core labour standards was mentioned in the final declaration: 
We renew our commitment to the observance of internationally recog-
nized core labour standards. The International Labour Organization 
(ILO) is the competent body to set and deal with these standards, and 
we affirm our support for its work in promoting them.40 
Following the Singapore Ministerial, pressure from several campaign affili-
ates to increase the participation of member organisations in the campaign 
led to the ICFTU establishing the Task Force on Trade, Investment and 
Labor Standards (TILS)Y Prior to the WTO's second Ministerial Conference 
in Geneva in May 1998, TILS organised a three day conference for its 
members, one of the main goals being to prepare unionists to lobby their 
governments on the issue of core labour standards.42 This strategy had a 
limited impact as the primary purpose of the Geneva conference was to cele-
brate the fiftieth anniversary of GATT rather than discuss substantive issues. 
In preparation for the 1999 WTO Ministerial Conference in Seattle, the 
ICFTU undertook a number of activities. These included a seminar in 
December 1998 entitled 'Globalisation, Investment and Labor Standards' 
dedicated to investigating a number of campaign proposals.43 These pro-
posals included the organisation of regional and subregional activities to 
achieve the campaign goals at a national level, the targeting of developed 
countries and regions such as Japan and the EU where governments 
appeared to be favouring a purely ILO-based approach to the labour stand-
ards issue, and the exploration of possible NGO alliances. 44 One of the most 
significant proposals was that it should be the ILO, not the WTO, that 
should decide if a country has violated core labour standards: the role of the 
WTO would be to ensure compliance through possible trade sanctions as a 
measure of last resort. 45 The ICFTU also managed to gain the firm support 
of the US government through the American Federation of Labour-Congress 
of International Organisations (AFL-CIO), the umbrella organisation for US 
unions. In October 1999, the US government stated its support for a WTO 
labour standards working party. However, this proposal did not involve the 
enforcement of labour rights with trade sanctions.46 The US government was 
responsive to the AFL-CIO largely because the Clinton administration was 
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under pressure to regain the support lost from labour over the adoption of 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)Y 
The ICFTU campaign culminated with the 1999 Seattle Ministerial Con-
ference, in which negotiations effectively broke down resulting in member 
states failing to agree upon the launching of the Millennium Round of trade 
negotiations. The lack of continuing consensus over the labour standards 
issue was only one of many factors leading to the meeting's collapse. 
Notwithstanding the 1996 Singapore declaration which commits to cooper-
ation with the ILO, the ICFTU campaign for a set of core labour standards 
at the WTO has met limited success. Nevertheless, the campaign has played 
an important role in drawing attention to the issue. of universal labour 
standards and one way or another, this issue is likely to be an ongoing con-
troversy within international trade governance that trade unions and civil 
society groups will not allow to languish quietly. 
Campaign against the trips Agreement 
The WTO's Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
Agreement (TRIPS) sets our the minimum standards for the protection of 
intellectual property, including patents for pharmaceutical products. The 
deadline for member states' implementation of the TRIPS Agreement is 
dependent on their level of development.4R The TRIPS Agreement obliges 
WTO member states to increase standards of patent protection for all prod-
ucts and removes a nation's ability to treat pharmaceutical products differ-
ently from other products.49 The TRIPS Agreement gives patent protection 
to pharmaceutical companies for 20 years, which means that developing 
countries will face increased difficulty in accessing affordable generic ver-
sions of patented drugs. 50 While the Agreement contained safeguards to deal 
with the negative consequences of patent protection, in practice it was 
unclear how developing countries could use these safeguards when patents 
become a barrier to medicine access. The INGO campaign against the 
TRIPS Agreement aimed to highlight the public health consequences for 
developing country citizens of inadequate access to essential medicines such 
as those for HIV / AIDS and malaria. The INGOs claimed that the enforce-
ment of WTO rules would have a negative effect on local manufacturing 
capacity and would remove a source of generic medicines on which develop-
ing countries rely.51 
The TRIPS campaign began in 1999 and was led by INGOs Oxfam 
International and Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF). The INGOs linked up 
with NGOs from Thailand and South Africa and focused attention on the 
effects of the TRIPS Agreement and its implementation at national leveP 2 
The campaign network supported and encouraged developing country gov-
ernments including Thailand, South Africa and Brazil to issue compulsory 
licences for the production of patented medicines without the permission of 
the drug companies holding the intellectual property.53 The NGOs lobbied 
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international organisations other than the WTO including the World 
Health Organisation, the World Bank and the United Nations Develop-
ment Programme,54 stating that developing countries should have the right 
to issue compulsory licences and build alliances with the generic pharmaceu-
tical industry to produce HIV I AIDS drugs in order to make them available 
at affordable prices. 55 Further, the INGOs mobilised international donors to 
purchase essential medicines and made them available to countries facing 
the HIV/AIDS crises. 56 The campaign network sought to discredit the busi-
ness agenda by highlighting the enormous profits that pharmaceutical com-
panies were earning from HIV/AIDS drugs. 57 
At the 2001 Doha Ministerial Conference, the controversy over TRIPS 
resulted in a partial victory for the NGO campaign and developing coun-
tries, with WTO member states agreeing upon the Declaration on TRIPS 
and Public Health58 in which WTO members' rights to employ TRIPS safe-
guards was clarified. Although this was regarded by public health advocates 
as an important achievement, it did not resolve all of the issues associated 
with public health and intellectual property protection. 59 For example, it 
did not resolve the problem of production for export from markets that 
provide patents to countries that do not grant pharmaceutical patents (and 
subsequently do not grant compulsory licences).6o After several weeks of 
intense negotiations in the run-up to the WTO Ministerial Conference in 
Cancun in September 2003, a deal was finally concluded. WTO member 
governments broke their deadlock and agreed on legal changes to make it 
easier for poorer countries to import cheaper generic medicines made under 
compulsory licensing, if they are unable to manufacture the medicines 
themselves.61 The decision waived the obligations of exporting countries 
under Article 31(f); provided certain conditions are met, any member 
country can export generic pharmaceutical products made under compulsory 
licences to meet the needs of importing countries.62 The INGO campaign 
played a key role in drawing attention to the provisions of TRIPS, support-
ing and aiding the voices of developing countries in the WTO arena and 
putting pressure on more powerful member governments, particularly the 
US, to clarify and reform the TRIPS Agreement. 
Campaign against the GATS 
The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) is one of the most 
comprehensive WTO agreements. Although GATS came into force in 
January 1995 with the establishment of the WTO, negotiations did not offi-
cially begin until early 2000. However, at an industry level, negotiations on 
basic telecommunications were successfully concluded in February 1997 and 
negotiations in the area of financial services were finalised in mid-December 
1997.63 
In March 2001, the WTO's Council for Trade in Services set out the 
guidelines for negotiations on the full range of services to be included in the 
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GATS. At the 2001 Doha Ministerial Conference, member states backed the 
efforts conducted up to that point, endorsed the guidelines and procedures 
documents, and set a deadline of 1 January 2005 to finalise the 
negotiations.64 The negotiation procedures for the GATS allow governments 
to select service areas for which they will make a commitment to guarantee 
access to foreign suppliers. Each WTO member must present a national 
schedule of commitments; however, there are no guidelines as to how exten-
sive these commitments should be. Some least developed countries have 
made commitments only in the tourism sector.65 The GATS negotiations 
require governments to 'offer' to list an increasing number of services to be 
included in the GATS. 
WTO members that favour the liberalisation of services, such as the US, 
the EU and Japan, highlight the flexible nature of liberalisation under the 
GATS. They claim that GATS allows countries to select which sectors to lib-
eralise through bilateral negotiations, determine the length of time needed to 
open its markets and even reverse liberalisation as long as adequate compen-
sation is paid to the affected firms.66 Despite assurances of the flexibility in 
GATS, there is serious unresolved contention over the definition of public 
services and whether public services will be drawn into the agreement.67 Sup-
porters of GATS point to the fact that the agreement clearly states that 
public services are excluded. In Article 1.3 of the agreement, public services 
are defined as services carried out in the exercise of governmental authority 
and provided neither 'on a commercial basis, nor in competition with one or 
more service suppliers,.68 Within many countries however, public services are 
provided by governments and the private sector. The NGOs argue that this 
ambiguity may lead to public services eventually being drawn into the GATS 
(where they are currently provided on a partially commercial basis) and that 
this ambiguity may end up being determined by the WTO's Dispute Settle-
ment Body after the GATS has been negotiated.69 
The IN GO campaign against the GATS is based on its negative effects on 
national democratic decision making over a range of public services, in 
particular, education and health as well as its less tangible effect on culture. 
NGOs argue that the ambiguity surrounding public services in the GATS 
will compel governments to privatise essential services, constrain their 
ability to regulate the provision of basic services and obligate them to open 
up these sectors to foreign corporations. The NGO campaign contends that 
particular sectors require regulation in order to protect the environment, 
improve public health, and maintain an equitable level of wealth distribu-
tion. The NGO Focus on the global south questions the claims made by 
proponents of services liberalisation, noting that where water services have 
been privatised, there has been an increase in prices and a fall in the quality 
of service.70 Moreover, developing nations are concerned that liberalising 
trade in services may weaken the sovereignty of local and national govern-
ments by jeopardising control over land use, licensing, environmental 
health, and local content and production rules in media.71 
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In calling for mobilisation, the INGOs have stated that the services nego-
tiations are 'geared towards complete liberalisation and deregulation of 
domestic markets, which pave the way for privatisation and increase the 
influence of multinational corporations over essential public services,.n The 
NGO campaign has argued that the flexibility in GATS is a myth. They 
assert that in bilateral negotiations, developing countries may be pressured 
to open sectors they would prefer to keep under protection and that the 
burden of paying compensation means that liberalisation is not easily 
reversible.73 If a nation seeks to withdraw a sector from GATS, the govern-
ment must enter into negotiations to compensate their trading partners for 
their lost business opportunities. 
INGOs have adopted a variety of strategies ranging from petitions, street 
demonstrations, the issuing of declarations and sign-on statements. On 19 
March 2001, a protest entitled 'Stop the GATS Attack', in which NGO rep-
resentatives from more than 30 countries were involved, was held in 
Geneva.74 This demonstration generated a campaign statement against the 
GATS which is now supported by over 500 organisations from 60 countries 
around the world. 75 On 9 February 2003, opposition to the GATS in Europe 
reached a new level with the European anti-GATS demonstration in Brus-
sels. This demonstration was organised by Belgian trade unions and NGOs 
and attracted over 15,000 people both from Belgium and other European 
countries. 76 In May 2003, civil society groups from developed and develop-
ing countries gathered in Nairobi to discuss the impact of GATS on the 
developing world. 77 In June 2003, African NGOs submitted a statement to 
the African Union Trade Ministers Meeting in Mauritius calling for a mora-
torium on the GATS negotiations, until independent and reliable impact 
assessments have been carried out.78 On 28 August 2003, 650 civil society 
representatives in India issued a demand to the Indian Prime Minister and 
commerce ministry calling for a moratorium on all commitments under the 
GATS.79 European NGOs are campaigning to have anti-GATS resolutions 
adopted by local governments. so Another mass demonstration against the 
GATS was held outside the WTO headquarters in Geneva on 17 February 
2005 to coincide with the most recent services negotiations by WTO 
member states. 
Overall, the NGO campaign has brought greater scrutiny to bear upon 
the GATS. The NGOs have identified a number of vague elements of the 
agreement and in response, proponents have been forced to defend the agree-
ment. Although officials have been dismissive of NGO claims, the anti-
GATS campaign has clearly affected the WTO Secretariat as well as 
Geneva-based diplomats. The WTO Secretariat released a report to counter 
NGO claims and negative press, entitled 'GATS - Fact and Fiction' ,Sl which 
has been widely received and propagated by the western financial media.82 
The report denounced the 'ill-informed and hostile criticism' of the negotia-
tions taking place under the GATS framework. The WTO's July 2004 
package which rescued negotiations following the breakdown of the 2003 
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Cancun Ministerial Conference83 has managed to put GATS negotIatIOns 
back on track. In December 2005, WTO member states convened a WTO 
Ministerial Meeting in Hong Kong to finalise the GATS negotiations begun 
in 2001. 
Campaign against a WTO foreign investment agreement 
The development of a multilateral investment agreement has been under 
discussion since the 1996 Singapore Ministerial Conference and is com-
monly referred to as one of the 'Singapore issues'.84 The regulation of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) subsequently emerged as one of the flashpoints in 
the Doha 'development round' of WTO negotiations. Put simply, the key 
issue at stake is should WTO rules ajJJ}ly to foreign investment? 
To an extent, investment is already dealt with under the WTO's Trade-
Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) Agreement. However, TRIMs only 
applies to trade in goods and prevents countries from imposing certain types 
of conditions on foreign investors. Because developing countries are continu-
ing to experience difficulties in implementing the Uruguay Round agree-
ments, TRIMs obligations, which were supposed to apply to developing 
countries from 1999/2000, have now become the subject of further negotia-
tion within the WTO.85 Investment in services is also under discussion as 
part of the GATS negotiations. 
At the Doha Conference, member states agreed to commence wide-
ranging multilateral investment negotiations.86 Yet, it was only in 1998 
that similar negotiations in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) towards a Multilateral Agreement on Investment 
(MAl) ended without result due to pressure from a highly successful NGO 
campaign.87 At the Doha Conference, the broad alliance of developing 
nations known as the Group of 77 (G77) unexpectedly did not strongly 
oppose the launching of negotiations on investment. However, within the 
G77, there was strong opposition from the 'like-minded group' comprised 
of India, Malaysia and Pakistan; these nations opposed the commencement 
of investment negotiations and merely sought further study on the possibil-
ity.88 On balance, developing countries are ambivalent about negotiations on 
investment due to their lack of resources for adequately negotiating these 
issues. They have questioned whether such an agreement would be positive 
for investment flows or beneficial for developing countries as well as whether 
the latest proposals offer an adequate degree of flexibility. 
The NGOs involved in the campaign against an investment agreement in 
the WTO have expressed serious doubt as to whether the WTO is the 
appropriate venue for an extensive international investment agreement. The 
NGO campaign also focuses on the potential detrimental effects of such an 
agreement on developing countries. The NGOs have argued that a one-size-
fits-all multilateral framework on investment liberalisation is inappropriate 
as its member nations are at different stages of development. The NGOs 
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have stated that a multilateral agreement on investment would not only 
bind member countries to pursue indiscriminate investment liberalisation, 
but would also significantly reduce the space for countries to manoeuvre 
investment policies to suit their specific conditions.89 NGOs have pointed to 
the fact that it may be difficult to design an agreement on foreign invest-
ment without also drawing in other types of capital flows, including short-
term flows and portfolio investment yo Moreover, while some NGOs focus 
on the economic effects, others such as the World Wide Fund for Nature 
(WWF) and the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) 
have been advocating that conditions relating to environmental protection 
be incorporated into any proposed investment agreement. 
A number of high profile NGOs jointly organised a series of seminars on 
a possible future WTO investment agreement and the other Singapore 
issues, which were held in Geneva during March 2003.91 The seminars 
brought together NGOs from around the world and provided a platform for 
interaction between civil society, independent experts and Geneva-based 
WTO delegates.92 The seminars also involved government officials from 
countries both favouring and opposing an investment agreement and there 
were presentations from ambassadors from three developing countries (India, 
Kenya and Uganda).93 The NGOs involved in these seminars issued a joint 
declaration calling upon WTO member nations to drop plans to launch 
negotiations on a new investment agreement at the 2003 Cancun Ministerial 
Conferencey4 Also during 2003, NGOs lobbied against an investment 
agreement at the meeting of the G8 in France, at a meeting of European 
trade ministers and at the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) Ministe-
rial Conference in Miami. In November 2003, NGOs visited the WTO Sec-
retariat and individual WTO missions (including the US, Brazil and South 
Africa) to exchange views and information about a potential WTO invest-
ment agreementY5 
Due to the breakdown of negotiations at the Cancun Conference, negotia-
tions on an investment agreement were not launched as expected. This was 
largely due to the alliance of developing nations, the Group of 21 (G21) 
which formed prior to the conference, who would not agree to negotiate on 
the Singapore issues, until progress was made on greater access for develop-
ing country agricultural products ro EU and US markets.96 The subsequent 
2004 July Package stated that WTO members have agreed not to expand 
the WTO's powers over the Singapore issues, which includes investment. It 
is difficult to assess the NGO campaign's influence on the eventual removal 
of investment from the Doha agenda. Certainly, the NGOs provided solid-
arity and assistance to developing country WTO members; however, the 
impact of the unity of the G21 of developing nations during the Cancun 
Conference was integral to investment negotiations eventually being 
dropped from the agenda in July 2004.97 
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Campaign for fair trade 
Although the origins of the fair trade movement may be traced back to the 
1940s, recent citizen dissatisfaction with trade liberalisation, combined with 
the difficulties civil society organisations face in achieving dialogue with the 
WTO has fostered the reinvigoration of fair trade. As Raynolds describes it, 
'[t}he fair trade movement critiques conventional production, trade and con-
sumption relations and seeks to create new and more egalitarian commodity 
networks.'98 Fair trade incorporates a number of issues of public concern 
ranging from global economic inequality, environmental degradation, corpor-
ate responsibility, labour rights and child labour. The idea of a global social 
contraer is prominent in this ongoing campaign: the practice of fair trade 
focuses on the responsibilities of populations in the global north for conditions 
in developing countries.99 Unlike many of the campaigns against the WTO, 
advocates -of fair trade accept that socially and environmentally responsible 
international trade has the potential to be a powerful tool for poverty 
reduction. lOo However, the 'rigged rules and double standards' sustained by 
powerful states are preventing the realisation of this goal at the WTO. 101 
As types of NGOs, alternative trade organisations (ATOs) are the lynch-
pins of the fair trade movement. The core aim of ATOs in the developed 
world is to alter consumption practices by encouraging consumer demand 
for goods that have been produced under fair conditions. ATOs select disad-
vantaged producer groups to whom they provide financial and technical 
support, assistance with product development and packaging as well as 
information on quality and safety standards to meet First World consumer 
demand preferences. The majority of fair trade goods are commodity prod-
ucts like coffee (the most widely consumed fair trade product), tea, honey, 
cocoa, bananas and nuts as well as cultural products or handcrafts including 
clothing, jewellery, textiles, furniture and musical instruments. For selected 
developing country producers, the fair trade movement has presented the 
opportunity to participate in the global economy, receive a fair wage and 
engage in economically and environmentally sustainable production. 
ATOs also lobby corporations, international organisations and domestic 
governments to adopt policies and introduce legislation that incorporates 
the objectives of the fair trade movement. 102 ATOs emphasise the education 
of Western consumers about fair traded products so that they can make 
informed decisions about the way in which their spending dollars are dis-
tributed. lU3 This is achieved through the dissemination of information about 
the cultures and lifestyles of developing country producers as well as the 
disadvantages that they face in participating in global markets. The 
labelling of fair trade products is an important tool in distinguishing fair 
trade products and it is a well-recognised label in North America and 
Europe. 
The success of the fair trade movement is expanding with the proportion 
of fair trade products sold growing annually. According to the Fair Trade 
Contesting {globalisation from above' 261 
Labelling Organisation (FLO), in 2003, general sales of fair trade labelled 
products totalled US$83,480 million, which represents an increase of 42.3 
per cent over the previous year. 104 The fastest growing markets are in 
Belgium, France, Italy and the US with growth rates between 80 per cent 
and 700 per cent, reflected in sales volumes calculated between 2002 and 
2003.105 Moreover, fair trade groups have established commercial agree-
ments with the European Commission and municipal councils in the United 
Kingdom to purchase fair trade products. 106 Although the fair trade sales 
figures represent only a tiny fraction of all goods exchanged globally, fair 
trade represents an alternative system of trade that incorporates human 
rights, economic equality and environmental concerns. The practice of fair 
trade is an important symbolic counterpoint to the international trade 
regime as administered by the WTO. 
Discussion and conclusion 
Let us turn to the six empirical questions relating to the prospects for the 
development of a global social contract as listed in Table 18.1. 
1 In challenging the undemocratic process, have INGOs made the process 
more democratic, and in what sense? Can the global social contract be 
democratic? And how? As Dahl states, extensive delegation of national 
decision making to an international institution has the potential to 
'move a political system beyond the democratic threshold'.107 Certainly, 
the transferral of national authority to the WTO has undermined 
national democratic processes and national control over decision making 
on economic policy. The idea of a global social contract should involve a 
democratic process. INGOs dispute the authority of the WTO to regu-
late an investment agreement, and attempt to establish democratic 
control over foreign investment. According to the normative claims of 
INGOs, a WTO multilateral investment agreement (to fulfil the terms 
of a global social contract) must be sensitive to particular national cir-
cumstances and varying levels of development. The campaign against a 
WTO investment agreement highlights the need for flexibility and 
adaptability in a global social contract. This repudiates Falk's view that 
regulatory uniformity must be a core element of a global social 
contract. lOS 
The INGO campaign against the GATS is concerned with the secre-
tive manner in which the negotiations are being conducted. The INGOs 
involved have complained that the negotiations are taking place behind 
closed doors and that most of the WTO members will not reveal their 
requests and offers. In response, INGOs are lobbying for increased 
transparency of the negotiations process. The INGOs have called on 
governments to publish their liberalisation offers and requests in detail 
to enable informed public discussion. They are also campaigning for 
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detailed and independent analyses of services liberalisation as well as 
public discussion of the sectors that have already been liberalised before 
further negotiations take place. The INGOs are attempting to maintain 
nation-state's democratic control over public services and oppose the 
private sector acquiring the ability to take over the provision of public 
services. This battle is still in progress and as such the result is not yet 
certam. 
2 Have INGOs forced the WTO to revise some economic contracts in 
order to meet social demands? The intellectual property case study 
shows how INGOs successfully clarified and incorporated social rights 
into the TRIPS. In their campaign against the WTO TRIPS Agree-
ment, INGOs have been successful in making global economic agree-
ments fairer in regards to developing countries. WTO member 
govel"nments agreed on legal changes that allow poorer countrIes to 
import less expensive generic medicines. 
3 Do the poor benefit from the INGO campaigns against the various 
WTO agreements? While on the whole, the record of INGO campaigns 
is not completely satisfactory, there are encouraging signs of success. As 
discussed above, the INGO campaign was vital in aiding South Africa, 
Brazil and Thailand to modify the WTO TRIPS Agreement. In 2005, 
the efforts made by INGOs in calling for the cancellation of the debt of 
underdeveloped African nations have brought some success in the 
World Economic Forum and the G8 Summit. 
4 Are INGOs significant parties in the emerging global social contract? 
Are they outsider challengers or insider policy-making participants? It 
is clear now that INCOs have established themselves as undeniably im/Jortant 
parties in a global social contral.t through challenging the undemocratic 
nature of WTO agreements and demanding that multilateral economic 
agreements provide social protection for the weak and poor. Due to the 
challenge that civil society presents, and following the Seattle protests 
in particular, the WTO has made some advances in recognising INGOs. 
With the exception of the Doha Ministerial Conference, successive 
WTO ministerial conferences have accredited an increasing number of 
NGOs with observer status (see Table 18.7). Nevertheless, NGOs may 
only observe plenary sessions and do not have the right to vote on key 
issues in the WTO. TheWTO selects NGOs that are deemed by the 
organisation to have a 'legitimate interest' in trade issues. 
In overcoming the constraints on NGO accreditation, NGOs are 
increasingly adopting an alternative method for gaining access to and 
influence in the WTO. A less perceptible process of dialogue between 
civil society and trade policy makers is under way at a national level. At 
the Singapore Ministerial Conference, successful lobbying resulted in 
ICFTU affiliates in several countries including the US, Canada, New 
Zealand, Denmark, Norway, Egypt, Tunisia, Burkina Paso and South 
Africa being accredited to their government's official delegations. 109 
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Additionally, after many years of NGO lobbying, several governments 
have allowed domestic NGOs onto their official national delegations at 
the Seattle and Doha Ministerial Conferences. Ito Ddamilura and Noor 
Abdi describe how the governments of Kenya and Uganda established 
multi-stakeholder advisory committees on trade policy and the WTO 
which led to NGOs becoming part of national delegations to WTO 
ministerial conferences. llL For the 1999 Seattle Ministerial Conference, 
the United Kingdom, Denmark, the Netherlands and the EU also 
allowed NGO representatives onto their official delegations. 1l2 More-
over, as was the case in the controversy surrounding the TRIPS Agree-
ment, some WTO members have consistently drawn on INGOs for 
trade-related research and media assistance. 113 This is evidence that civil 
society groups are establishing themselves as important parties to an 
emerging global social contract as both outsider challengers and insider 
policy-maker participants. NGOs, social movements and citizens are 
challenging the WTO not only by staging demonstrations and partici-
pating in global days of action, but are beginning to exert influence 
through more formal (and potentially more consequential) channels. 
5 Have INGOs successfully challenged the international business 
community to implement universal values? A global social contract 
should take labour standards seriously and contain a social clause in 
regard to these standards. INGOs forced the issue of core labour stand-
ards onto the WTO's agenda, with this issue being taken up by the EU 
and the US for the WTO to recognise labour issues as a key element of 
international trade. At the Singapore Ministerial Conference, WTO 
members agreed to institutional cooperation with the ILO. The Singa-
pore Declaration states that the WTO supports the work of the ILO on 
the labour standards issue. Perhaps a longer term strategy for incorpo-
rating labour issues into the WTO may lie in the area of social labelling 
and company codes of conduct. However, it is not clear that such cam-
paigns pose a great enough obstacle for the WTO to become seriously 
involved. 
The debate over core labour standards at the WTO revealed the 
limits of the ICFTU speaking on behalf of the international labour 
movement, especially unions in less developed countries. This campaign 
exposed the divide between developed and developing country trade 
unions and this was reflected in the WTO member states' disagreement 
over the issue. It is uncertain as to whether a multilateral agreement on 
labour standards will be achieved through the WTO in the near future. 
Some see this as a victory for developing countries by allowing them to 
benefit from trade, while others see it as a defeat for their citizens, who 
will continue to work in very poor conditions. 
6 Do INGOs make trade fairer? Do they make the WTO agreements 
fairer and in what sense? Through the practice of fair trade, INGOs are 
attempting to construct an alternative global social contract. Purchasing 
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fair trade products offers a unique method for expressing dissatisfaction 
about the policies of the WTO and the perceived inequities that trade 
liberalisation creates. Fair trade principles centre on consumer educa-
tion, paying producers a fair price, promoting democratic, worker-
owned cooperative workplaces, encouraging environmentally sustainable 
production, establishing long-term working relationships, providing 
financial and technical support and respecting cultural identity. 
Nevertheless, the practice of fair trade has been accused of not ade-
quately challenging the neoliberal order. Critics argue that the fair trade 
strategy promotes a form of lifestyle politics at the expense of more 
meaningful political engagement, understanding and solidarity. Ll4 In 
particular, it has been charged with promoting consumerism in the 
developed world without questioning consumerism's links with under-
development or environmental sustainability. The practice of fair trade 
can make developing country producers reliant on the often fickle tastes 
and preferences of developed country consumers. Furthermore, there is a 
tension between consumerism and citizenship. In the developed world, 
only those who can afford to pay a premium price for fair trade goods 
can participate in this alternative global social contract. Fair trade 
organisations have become sidetracked by a perceived need to compete 
for customers with mainstream businesses, which has diverted resources 
from the more politically efficacious goal of raising public awareness of 
international trade issues. 
From the above mixed results of an empirical testing of the normative 
theory of a global social con tract; we can address two unexamined assum p-
tions made by Richard Falk. Falk draws a distinction between two rival 
forces: 'globalisation from above' to describe global economic liberalisation 
as endorsed by powerful states, transnational corporations and global eco-
nomic institutions and 'globalisation from below' to describe the social 
movements and NGOs that are seeking to promote a global community 
committed to human rights, economic justice and environmental sustain-
ability beyond the territorial state. The successful campaign against the 
TRIPS Agreement demonstrates that this is a somewhat forced dichotomy 
and that the basis of developing a global social contract instead centres on 
forging a compromise and even cooperation between these two forces. lls 
Second, in attempting to find a path through the cooptation of the state 
by global economic forces, Falk employs the global social contract idea 
stating that it should be based on 'basic human needs' and regulatory unifor-
mity. While regulatory uniformity is an appropriate goal in terms of human 
rights and labour standards, differing levels of industrialisation in developed 
and developing nations means that rather than being uniformly applied, 
global economic policy needs to be carefully tailored to suit domestic 
conditions. This is evident in relation to global investment rules as is borne 
out in the case study (see Table 18.8) of the campaign against a WTO 
Table 18.8 Summary of case studies of INGO campaigns against the WTO 
Campaign 
Global Day of Action 
Against the WTO 
'Millennium Round' 
Aims 
To protest against 
the WTO launching 
the Millennium 
Round of trade 
negotiations. While 
environmentalists 
and social rights 
campaigners called 
for the incorporation 
of social and 
environmental into 
the WTO and for 
the organisation to 
be held to greater 
account, more 
radical groups 
compnsmg 
isolationists, 
protectionists and 
anatchists, called 
for abolition of the 
WTO. 
Strategies Outcomes Links with power-
national or 
transnational 
T ransnatiortal 
alliances 
The staging of street The WTO Ministerial Weak: no obvious Strong: the global 
demonstrations and conference collapsed relations with day of action involved 
othet activities in due to disagreement national governments III protest events 
various locations among member states or international in 22 countries in 
around the world on over many of the organisations. 97 cities around the 
30 November 1999 same issues for which world. 
to coincide with the 
WTO conference. 
The 30,000 
protesters in Seattle 
attracted the most 
media attention. 
While the WTO 
conference provided 
the catalyst for the 
global day of action 
and drew together 
the protesters, other 
targets included 
symbols of corporate 
globalisation such as 
multinational 
corporations, banks 
and stock exchanges. 
protesters were 
lobbying. The 
Millenium Round of 
trade negotiations 
failed to be launched. 
Consensus 
Weak: there were 
strong ideological 
divisions between 
reformist, 
professional NGOs 
and populist social 
movements, 
between trade 
unionists, 
environmentalists, 
anarchists, etc. 
continued 
Table 18.8 Continued 
Campaign Aims Strategies 
Campaign for WTO To have a core set of The ICFTU lobbied 
Core Labour 1LO conventions powerful WTO 
Standards adopted by the WTO member states and 
in order to make attempted to build 
them enforceable. alliances with trade 
unions from 
developing countries 
and other 
Outcomes 
Success was limited 
with labour issues 
being rejected as an 
appropriate issue for 
the WTO. However, 
WTO members 
agreed to 
institutional 
Links with power -
national or 
transnational 
Transnational 
alliancess 
Strong: ICFTU has Strong: the ICFTU 
greater informal has a membership of 
access co the WTO 127 million people 
Secretariat than other from 136 countries, 
civil society groups. the campaign also 
Trade unions also comprised NGOs 
drew on their and various 
domestic political international trade 
non-af6liated NGO~. cooperation with the 
ILO. The declaration 
states that the WTO 
importance to build secretariats. 
strong links with 
powerful national 
Campaign Against 
the TRIPS 
agreement 
To modify WTO The NGO network 
rules on intellectual supported national 
property rights in governments 
order to institute (Thailand, South 
greater leverage for Aftica and Brazil) in 
national governments issuing compulsory 
to make generic licences for the 
medicines available production of generic 
to citizens. medicines. The 
NGOs lobbied 
against TRIPS in 
policy-relevant 
international forums 
supports the work of governments, 
the ILO. particularly the US. 
On 30 August 2003, Strong: NGOs Strong: INGOs 
formed alliances with WTO member worked wi th 
governments agreed 
on legal changes co 
make it easier for 
developing nations 
to import generic 
medicines made 
under compulsory 
licensing if they 
are unable to 
manufacture the 
medicines themselves. 
national governments national NGOs from 
(South Africa, international 
Thailand, Brazil) and organisations 
international (UNDP, World 
organisations Bank and WHO). 
(UNDP, World 
Bank and WHO). 
C orlsetlSUs 
Weak: a number 
of trade unions 
from developing 
countries disagreed 
with the 
institutionalisation 
of core labour 
standards in the 
WTO. 
Strong. 
Campaign Against 
the GATS 
Agreement 
To make WTO 
negotiations more 
transparent and 
democratic. To 
maintain adequate 
state control over 
public services 
(water, education 
health, etc.) 
(the World Health 
Organisation, the 
W orId Bank, the 
UNDP), they 
mobilised international 
donors to purchase 
essential medicines 
and sought to 
discredit the business 
agenda by 
highlighting the 
magnitude of their 
profits. 
The NGOs 
organised public 
demonstrations, 
forums and seminars 
and released NGO 
declarations and 
sign-on statements. 
Medium: informal 
alliances between 
developing country 
governments and 
NGOs. 
Negotiations in 
Cancun collapsed 
before GATS was 
discussed. The 
WTO'sJuly 2004 
package put 
negotiations back on 
track. The agreement 
was endorsed at the 
Hong Kong 
Ministerial Conference 
in December 2005. 
Stong: transnational 
alliances between 
INGOs and 
developing country 
NGOs. 
Strong: all civil 
SOCiety groups 
involved agreed 
that WTO 
negotiations must 
be more transparent 
and agreed on the 
goal of equitable 
access to public 
servICes. 
continued 
Table 18.8 Continued 
Campaign 
Campaign Against 
a WTO Foreign 
Investment 
Agreement 
Aims 
To prevent the 
adoption of a WTO 
multilateral 
Investment 
agreement. 
Strategies 
The NGOs leading 
the campaign 
convened a series of 
seminars held in 
Outcomes 
A WTO investment 
agreement was one 
of the key issues 
over which the 
Geneva during negotiations broke 
March 2003 involving down at the 2003 
more than 50 NGOs Cane un Ministerial 
and social movements Conference. Not just 
to address possible blocking, but 
future WTO rules on removing this issue 
investment and other from the Doha Round 
new issues. A civil 
society/NGO joint 
declaration was 
issued. NGOs 
organised parallel 
meetings to the 
WTO' s Working 
Group on trade and 
investment and also 
held meetings with 
the WTOs Secretariat. 
. . 
IS seen as a major 
victory for civil 
society. 
Links with power .:.. 
natior/al or 
transnational 
Strong: 
representatives of 
developing country 
governments were 
involved in the 
. . 
semmar senes. 
T rauStlational 
alliances 
CotlSlmsus 
Strong: Strong. 
transnational alliances 
between INGOs and 
developing country 
NGOs. 
Campaign for Fair 
Trade 
To challenge the 
inequity of the 
global trading 
sysrem as 
administered by 
the WTO. To 
engender greater 
equlty in global 
trade between 
developing countries 
and consumers and 
producers. To 
ensure producers are 
paid a fair price for 
their products. 
The demonstration 
of an alternative 
trading system that 
incorporates social 
rights and 
environmental 
sustainability. To 
link developing 
country consumers 
with developing 
country producers in 
a framework of fair 
trade. Fair trade 
labelling of products 
deemed to be 
produced under fair 
and environmentally-
friendly conditions. 
The proportion of 
fair trade prod ucts 
sold is growing 
annually. However, 
as it is a symbolic 
demonstration of an 
equitable trading 
system, it has not 
affected the WTO 
not directly 
challenged it. 
Weak: however, fair 
trade groups have 
commercial 
agreements with 
governments 
(European 
Commission, UK 
municipal councils) 
to purchase fair 
trade products. 
Medium: alliances 
between producers 
and consumers. 
International fair 
trade umbrella 
organisations include 
the Fair Trade 
Labelling 
Organisation (FLO), 
Fair Trade 
Federation (FTF) 
and International 
Federation for 
Alternative Trade 
(lFAT). 
High: a popular 
movement in the 
developed world. 
Proponents believe 
that equitable trade 
can contribute to 
economic growth 
and decrease 
poverty. 
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foreign investment agreement. The development of a global social contract 
for the international trade regime will be more complex than the establish-
ment of a uniform global economic policy framework. 
In short, the November 1999 Global Day of Action, in particular, the 
Seattle street demonstration, has become a symbol of the awakening of 
global civil society and marks the trend towards greater interchange with 
globalisation from above. However, while the WTO and INGOs continue to 
share an uneasy coexistence, the increasing role of INGOs as outsider chal-
lengers and insider policy-making participants indicates an evolving process 
from confrontation (with globalisation from above) to an emerging global 
social contract. 
In the process of developing a global social contract, we need to investi-
gate the role of international corporations in regards to their complex rela-
tionships with INGOs. Is it possible for transnational corporations and 
international organisations to coopt some INGOs into the structure of 
power? Will a global social contract entrench or limit the authority of inter-
national organisations? These questions deserve further investigation. 
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